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Abstract
This exposition examines the relationship between the history of historiography and the linguistic 
turn, the latter being considered a challenge to the former. At first we attempt to define the meaning 
of “the viewpoint of the general history of historiography” by taking the history of historiography in 
its entirety from the Greeks to the present, thereby undermining the credibility of self-proclaimed 
“ruptures”, “epistemological cuts”, “revolutions”, “mutations” and “new histories” in the recent 
developments of the general history of historiography, and thus questioning the “scientific” status 
of the discourse history. In the second section we try to depict the linguistic turn and the nature 
of the “challenge” it poses to the history of historiography. In the third section, with examples 
from Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht and Peter Englund, we qualify the role of Hayden White in the 
formulation of this challenge and its consequences for the practice of the discourse history. The 
conclusion resumes the arguments of Siegfried Kracauer, Arnaldo Momigliano, Johan Huizinga, 
Carlo Ginzburg and Hayden White (his in 2011), which combine to reinforce the importance of 
considering the entirety of the general history of historiography when dealing with the discourse 
history, conceived as part of an “intermediate domain” that aspires to a scientific status (the 
commitment to the truth), but which cannot break free from the construction of collective memory 
or the settling of accounts with the past, hence the approximate nature of historical knowledge. 
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The title of this exposition concerns two different topics, namely the history 
of historiography and the linguistic turn (the latter being considered a challenge 
to the former). Now this “challenge” could be portrayed as an affront to be 
redressed in a duel or as the elicitation of a response. Supposedly there would 
be an established older object – the history of historiography – whose comfort 
zone began to be questioned by the more recent linguistic turn. Let us therefore 
try to characterize them and then speculate on the nature of the provocation 
and their possible answers.
The Viewpoint of the General History of Historiography
At the outset, a formal procedure is in order, so that misunderstandings should 
not cloud our topic. It therefore behoves us to propose the following nomenclature:
•	H1 – Event history, in other words, all human events, at any time, in any 
space (characterized therefore by the infinity of objects);
•	H2 – Discourse history, which is the work proper of the historian, the 
fragmentary account of human events; it makes use of narrative with the 
purpose of reconstructing them with a view to the constitution of a social 
memory;
•	 H3 – Historiography, or the history of discourse history, the several 
ways of writing this fragmentary account, in its most diverse modalities, 
throughout time;
•	H4 – History of the histories of historiography, that is to say, the 
historiography of the histories of historiography. 
Our focus is accordingly on the relationship between the discourse history 
(H2) and the history of the discourse history (H3), which we shall call the history 
of historiography.  
Considering the modern general historiographical studies, there is some 
consensus among established authors (CROCE 1973; HAY 1977; KELLEY 1991) 
that the first   concerted effort to write a general history of historiography was 
made by the Swiss historian Eduard Fueter (1876-1928) who in 1911 published 
a history of modern historiography ranging from the Renaissance to the late 
nineteenth century (FUETER 1914). From then on, i.e. from the Belle Époque, 
this historiographical production was no longer present only in bibliographies 
(LANGLOIS 1896), or in histories of literature and literary genres (ALBERT 1883; 
ROMERO 1888; LÉVRAULT 1905) and came to occupy a specific place within the 
historical production itself. 
From a thorough examination of general histories of historiography it was 
possible to observe what we could call a change in the structure and content 
thereof, as over time they ceased to be associated with or engaged in the 
formation of “national historiographies” as in accordance with the pioneering 
model of history of history used by Eduard Fueter and began to include a wide 
variety of approaches and themes (IGGERS 1975; BREISACH 1983; BOURDÉ; 
MARTIN 1983; KELLEY 2006; BURROW 2008). As is well known history as 
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an academic discipline is something directly associated with the formation of 
nation states, beginning in the late eighteenth century (BERGER; DONOVAN; 
PASSMORE 1999).
Thus, with an overview of the history of discourse history from the Greeks 
to the present day, we realized that, instead of considering only discontinuities 
in the writing of history that, as a rule, are libelled variously [“mutation” 
(CARBONELL 1976), “rupture”, “epistemological cut”, “revolution” (BURKE 
1990)] in the history of historiography, it was possible to contemplate this 
insistence on emphasizing such discontinuities and, with greater serenity, to 
evaluate the nature of this succession of “historical schools”, “historical styles” 
or, more simply, the various modes of writing   discourse history. 
The aforementioned study has shown us how often each new trend in the 
writing of history defines itself as “new”, “modern”, “post-modern” 1, thereby 
opposing its predecessors by using a variety of labels to categorize them, such 
as “descriptive”, “factual”, “positivist” or “historisante” (FEBVRE 1992c, p. 114-
118),  “traditional”, “official”, “outdated”, “dated”. It would appear that this list, 
by no means exhaustive, now includes “Marxist” history and may include other 
names in the future as well.  
As a form of legitimization, of defining one’s own identity, or as an attempt 
to transcend the former ways of writing history, the prevailing way – by dint of 
what is sometimes called “historical school” – compels its harbingers to caricature 
and view with contempt previous manifestations and to introduce themselves as 
self-proclaimed representatives of a “new-history”. Incidentally, this is ancient 
epithet, found since the fourth and fifth centuries in Zozimo – Historia nea, and 
in today’s Nouvelle histoire (MONTELATICI 1916, p. 44; MOMIGLIANO 1987; 
NORWICH 1992; BROWN 1995). Currently, besides the adjective “new”, other 
words and affixes have been added, such as the several “posts” and “turns” of 
historiography, like the present linguistic turn.  
It is significant that, in general, the latest fad in the field of historiography 
will consistently endeavour to oppose preceding historiographical works, thus 
revealing the derogatory purpose of despising erstwhile breakthroughs. This 
establishing of “founding reports” of “new histories” has another harmful effect. 
The new generations of historians, by reason of those labels, end up failing to 
carefully examine those previous works and to situate them in the historical 
context in which they were produced; ultimately, they cease to realize the 
historicity of the writing of history itself.
Note, for example, Lucien Febvre’s zeal to specify what was historically proper 
of Rabelais’ own “religion” (FEBVRE 1968), since, according to the historian, 
documents were not enough to identify the character as an atheist; thus the 
historical account of the context in which Rabelais lived contrasts significantly 
with the ahistorical treatment Febvre gives to Charles-Victor Langlois and Charles 
Seignobos, authors of Introduction aux études historiques (1898) (LANGLOIS; 
1 This formulation of the characteristics of postmodernity is attributed to Jean-François Lyotard (Lyotard 
1979). It is worth remembering, however, that twenty years before, there already was some formulation 
about them. See: MILLS 1965, p. 180.
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SEIGNOBOS 1992). Lucien Febvre seems to ignore, in relation to them, the 
reason so much importance was given to document forgery. In the preface to a 
new edition of that Introduction, Madeleine Ribérioux sensibly underscores the 
importance of the issue, as the authors lived in the same period of time of the 
Dreyfus Affair when a glaring miscarriage of justice and a “legitimized” injustice 
notoriously took place precisely because of the use of forged documents.  
Thus, “outmoded” past historians are often mentioned, but seldom the 
object of a more comprehensive study – for instance, who would take the 
trouble to read Démocraties et capitalisme (1848-1860) immediately after 
Lucien Febvre’s fierce attacks on it? (POUTHAS 1948)2 – inasmuch as they have 
been clrearly labeled   as “outdated”.3
Hence our exam of the aforementioned general histories of historiography 
has corroborated the idea that, in dealing with the history of discourse history, 
one must have as an important point of reference what we call “the vantage 
point of the general history of historiography”. That perspective considers that 
any historiographical  assessment must take into account all the history of 
historiography, from the Greeks –  i.e. Herodotous –  to the present (NOVAIS; 
SILVA 2011, p. 7-70; SILVA 2001).
Clearly, throughout the history of discourse history, there have been 
changes of approach, themes and expository styles. Nonetheless, we insist, not 
only do breaks occur, but also continuities and connections between the most 
current historiographical works and the historiography that preceeded them. 
Changes throughout the history of discourse history are therefore indicated in 
a recurrent fashion: whether discontinuities or continuities, and the ways “new 
histories” are heralded by their pionneers.  
Another important implication to consider in assessing historiographical 
studies, from the vantage point of the general history of historiography, has a 
bearing on the very concept of discourse history. Evidently, this does not call 
for deconstructing the process by which this area of knowledge developed 
into an autonomous discipline aspiring to scientific status ever since the 
nineteenth century, but for an attempt to raise awareness about some aspects 
which we consider decisive for the frame of reference that we are seeking 
to specify, namely that the “linguistic turn” constitutes a “challenge” to the 
“history of historiography”. 
The worldwide impact that inventions, theories, conquests in science and 
consequent technologies had during the nineteenth century has yet in all likelihood 
to be extensively and properly assessed, but this one aspect can and should be 
emphasized:  the labels “science” and its derivatives “scientific” and “scientist” 
made history and conferred upon their bearers an aura of credibility, reverence, 
respectability, authority and dignity that put them in a position”above suspicion”.
2 About this author and this work: FEBVRE 1992b, p. 99-103. The polemical author also took part in a 
prestigious collection of modern history: POUTHAS 1971, p. 389-415.
3 There is obviously an important exception when dealing with histographical studies of a particular historian 
such as: ROMILLY 1998; MOMIGLIANO 1966; EYCK 1982; ROBERTS 1987; PORTER 1988; FINK 1991; 
CANNADINE 1992; MELLOR 1993; MÜLLER 2003; MILLER 2007; BENTLEY 2011; PAUL 2011.
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Since then, the conquering of an identity, of a legitimacy, in short, 
the right of any area of knowledge to exist and be autonomous, demanded 
that it should be or look “scientific”. The refusal to bestow such a scientific 
label upon a certain suitor would be tantamount to damnation; he became 
an outcast, no loger the object of attention except perhaps as an object 
of ridicule, the school dunce as it were. Some suitors suffered this grim 
fate, such as Franz Joseph Gall’s (1758-1828) “phrenology”, Francis Galton’s 
(1822-1911) “eugenics”, once deemed to be the “science of good breeding” 
(BOGARDUS 1965, p. 347-357) and also Lamarck (1744-1829) and Cesare 
Lombroso’s (1836-1909) theories  currently out of any consideration in the 
field of science.
We consider that it is within this historical context that we must understand 
the efforts of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels to postulate a “scientific socialism” 
as opposed to “utopian socialism”, as well as Sigmund Freud’s insistence on 
asserting the “scientific” character of psychoanalysis. This attitude spread beyond 
the traditional branches of knowledge: suffice it to say that the formulator of 
what is called “Spiritism” defined it as “the science of observation”.
Consequently, it could not have been different with history, which was 
achieving recognition, professorships, financial resources to hire teachears, for 
conducting research and publishing – in short, the discipline acquired citizenship 
rights, “droit à la ville”. We can thus collect numerous instances of history being 
called a “science”. Various authors, from different backgrounds, defend the 
“scientific” status of history. Examples:
“We know only a single science, the science of history” [1845] – Karl Marx 
and Friedrich Engels (MARX 1965, p. 304).
“The science of history is the result of empirical perception, experience and 
investigation”   [1858]  – Johann Gustav Droysen (2009, p. 36).
“History is the science that investigates and expounds the facts concerning 
[...] human beings (...)” [1859] – Ernst Bernheim (1937, p. 47).
“History is and must be a science” [1862] – Fustel de Coulanges (1973, p. 
179).
“... the present Introduction to historical studies  has been conceived as 
an  essay on the method of historical sciences”  [1898]  – Charles-Victor 
Langlois and Charles Seignobos (1992, p. 18).
“It has not yet become superfluous to insist that history is a science, no 
less and no more.” [1902] – John Bagnell Bury (1973, p. 210).
 “History is the science that attempts to describe, explain and comprehend 
the phenomena of the life [...] of men” [1921] – Wilhelm Bauer (1921. p. 
38).
“History, science of man, science of the human past”  [1933] – Lucien 
Febvre (1992a, p. 12).
“... History is a rigorous science ...”  [1946] – Louis Halphen (HALPHEN 
1948, p. 44).
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In our view, we historians seem to ignore the very historicity of the concept 
of history, then defined as a science, as an autonomous and academic discipline 
in the context of the scientific boom of the nineteenth century – we shall return 
to this idea afterward – hence, in dealing with the impact of the “linguistic turn” 
(as a challenge) upon the history of historiography, the point of view of the 
general history of historiography will be taken, thereby compassing the history 
of discourse history in its entirety.
The Linguistic Turn 
The so-called linguistic turn was translated into Spanish and now into 
Portuguese as “giro linguístico”. This expression came into general use within the 
context of Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy tradition, and it indicated that many 
of the issues then regarded as philosophical were actually linguistic problems; 
in other words, philosophers could be using language to inadvertenly create 
problems otherwise nonexistent (QUINE 2011, p. 11-35).4 
As regards the origin of this expression, there is a consensus that it was 
first used by Gustav Bergmann5 and that it inspired the title of the anthology 
organized by Richard McKay Rorty, who collected articles by well-established 
authors in linguistic philosophy with the aim of showing the “various ways in 
which  linguist philosophers have viewed philosophy and  philosophical method 
over the last thirty five years” (RORTY 1992, p. I). 
Rorty’s reflections came to include history when he called attention to the 
fact that one who uses language will not always be capable of ascertaining 
whether one is responding to a “compulsion of language” or a “compulsion of 
experience”. In other words, when an interlocution is established there is a 
tendency to confuse the “compulsion of experience” – what is said about is real 
– with the “compulsion of language” – the way in which something is said about 
what said about what is real. In short, the question raised is whether the object 
of interlocution is a language issue or a matter of fact.  In this way, an interest 
in the philosophy of language was awakened in relation to history, constituting 
what came to be called “philosophy of linguistic history” (RORTY 1979, p. 169 
apud ANKERSMIT 2004, p. 124-129). Meanwhile developments and debates 
around structuralism and linguistics also resulted in an insistence of the non- 
-referential use of language; Jacques Derrida and Roland Barthes stand out, 
among others.
Jacques Derrida draws attention to the fact that one’s reading should not be 
reduced to reproducing the text; nor should it manipulate the text into something 
extraneous to itself, namely and indeterminate referent (methaphysical, historical, 
psychobiographical or any other kind of reality) or into a meaning outside the 
text whose content lay outside (written) language. Derrida then concludes that 
“there is nothing outside the text” (“Il n’y a pas de hors-texte”), in other words, 
language is autonomous, self-contained in itself  (DERRIDA 2004, p. 194-195).  
4 I am grateful to Professor João Carlos Passoni for kindly suggesting this text. 
5 “All linguistic philosophers talk about the world by means of talking about a suitable language. This is the 
linguistic turn...” (BERGMAN 1964, p. 177 apud  RORTY 1992, p. 8).
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Roland Barthes is even more adamant than Derrida. Focusing on the 
historical discourse, he states that a fact can only be defined in a tautological 
way: what is observed precedes that which is observable, yet the observable 
is only what is worthy to be remembered. According to Barthes, we thus arrive 
at what he considers the paradox of historical discourse: though a fact has 
only a linguistic existence (“le fait n’a jamais qu’une existence linguistique”), it 
constitutes the end of a discourse, as which is regarded as if it were a mere copy 
of another entity, namely what we call “real”. So, from Barthes’ perspective, 
the historical discourse would be the only one in which the referent is regarded 
as being external to the discourse and at once inacessible outside the same 
discourse (BARTHES 2012, p. 194).
For our purposes we could say that the linguistic turn has become a 
convenient label to express the idea that language is self-referential. Instead 
of saying that language is a means whereby one can refer to real-world objects 
(that is, a neutral instrument to point to, name and describe reality), language 
has a specificity of its own and is far from neutral.
In history the linguistic turn is commonly associated with Hayden White 
(PAUL 2011, p. 2; ANKERSMIT 2004, p. 119). Before him, it concerned the 
philosophy of linguistics, of Anglo-Saxon tradition (Richard M. Rorty), new 
developments in linguistics and French thinkers, particularly Jacques Derrida and 
Roland Barthes. White, inspired by these authors as well as by literary theory 
and literary criticism – specially the works of Northrop Frye (1973) – brought 
this isssue into the field of history with his work on nineteenth century historians 
and philosophers Metahistory (WHITE 1992). His proclamation of the historical 
text as nothing but a “literary artifact” (WHITE 1994b, p. 97-116), from the 
standpoint of the linguistic turn, stirred mixed reactions from historians, thus 
constituting the “challenge” we shall proceed to discuss.
Answers to the Challenge
Once raised the issue of the linguistic turn in historiography, it can be said 
that intense debates took place (and it would be pointless here to recount each 
one of them in detail), particularly among those who remained critical of the use 
of the linguistic turn in historiography.6 Other authors, such as Martin Jay, have 
sought a compromise, alleging that it would be unfeasible to determine whether 
language is absolutely transparent or absolutely opaque and that this approach 
to the subject is extreme (JAY 1982, p. 86-110). There are also authors for whom 
the practice of history is no longer what it used to be, as we are now required 
to take the linguistic turn into account (MUNSLOW 1993) and yet other authors 
who endeavor to refer the linguistic turn beyond the frontiers of contemporary 
history (CLARK 2004).   
It is now necessary that we indicate the manner in which the linguistic 
turn has been incorporated into history, not theoretically, but in the historian’s 
6 Among many: MOMIGLIANO 1993, p. 304; HANDLIN 1979; NOVICK 1996; NOIRIEL 1996; EVANS 1999; 
SPIEGEL 2009.
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day-to-day research practices. We consider that Herman Paul’s statement that 
Hayden White’s influence on the practice and writing of history has been virtually 
“zero” is an exageration (PAUL 2011, p. 1-14). Ultimately, one of the messages 
the work of Hayden White leaves for historians is: “tell less” or “write less” and 
you will be writing “good” history; or “if you are really in the mood to write, 
move on to literature”. Hence the works of Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht and Peter 
Englund have become excellent role models for authors who will listen Hayden 
White’s message. For the purposes of illustration we shall proceed to examine 
one work of each author. 
Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht is the author of In 1926, living at the edge of time. 
He attempts to be “non-narrative”, that is to say, the book is not a tale that 
transmits the history of the year 1926 (GUMBRECHT 1999). In short chapters 
not in chronological, but alphabetical order, it is divided into three parts: 
“Arrays”, “Codes” and “Codes collapsed”. The first part includes snapshots of 
contemporary issues, such as “airplanes”, “boxing”, “cremation”, etc.; the second 
part brings opposing pairs: “action  vs. impotence”, “center vs. periphery”, “male 
vs. female”, etc; the third part, casts doubt on some opposites: “immanence vs. 
transcendence”, “male vs. female”, “present vs. past”, etc. At the beginning of 
the book Gumbrecht writes a “User’s Manual” reminiscent to Julio Cortazar’s 
Hopscotch (1963) and Milorad Pávitch’s Khazar Dictionary (1984), informing 
the reader that he or she can begin to read anywhere in the text and hereafter 
either read on or jump back to a random section, thereby deliberately shuffling 
synchrony and diachrony and thus leaving to the reader’s discretion the task 
of building their own 1926. A fourth part – “Frames” – discusses the study and 
teaching of history.
In The beauty and the sorrow: an intimate history of the First World 
War (ENGLUND 2012), Peter Englund follows the example of Gumbrecht and 
experiments with “non-narrative” writing; his intention is to show what it was 
like to live at that time. The table of contents shows the following sections: 
“To the reader”, “Dramatis Personae”, five chapters corresponding to the war 
years, “The end” and finally a closing chapter with the title “Envoi”. From the 
outset the author introduces himself as an academic historian by profession 
and a sometime war correspondent (Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq). As a historian, 
he once yearned to be present himself at the events he  described; when, 
however, he was able to do it, he soon realized that being there is no guarantee 
of being able to understand an event. His book is therefore about the way the 
war was experienced by some of his contemporaries and not about the war 
itself, hence his choice of twenty individuals from different backgrounds and 
playing various roles, none of whom high in the hierarchies. The next section 
provides name, nationalities, occupations and ages, from the “American wife of 
a Polish aristocrat” to an “English nurse in the Russian army”, and including a 
“Venezuelan cavalryman in the Ottoman army”, etc. The chapters covering the 
war years follow, and they are always preceded by a chronology of the main 
events. In this way, he concocts a mixture of personal stories and the author’s 
own interpretation. The last couple of pages – “Envoi” – reproduce two texts: 
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a short speech made by a German priest and the testimony of a soldier who in 
1925, having faced the horrors of war, decides to become a politician. His name? 
Adolf Hitler.
There is no doubt that the gripping works of Gumbrecht and Englund 
absorb the reader from the first page, aind it could be argued that they carry 
out at least a part of the task they have undertaken, namely provide snapshots, 
as it were, of the atmosphere in the early years of the twentieth century. And 
yet, exit the authors – to allow the characters to speak for themselves – and 
the problems begin. The very choice of title, subject, documents and their order, 
and their comments on what is said in each document, betray their indisputable 
authorship; there is an underlying narrative, as if Gumbrecht and Englund had 
left to the reader the task of constructing it. But even this is a half-truth, since the 
reader would not be capable of constructing such narrative without their carefully 
select, commented and presented data. Deliberately or not, the absence of a 
chronology nothwithstanding, there is an order of sorts, inasmuch as the reader 
is provided with the elements needed to “create the narrative” from the “menu” 
offered by the authors. Such books are in fact authorial works. They might even 
propose an alternative way of producing narrative, which nonetheless does not 
preclude its own existence. We cannot therefore subscribe to these authors’ 
claim that “non-narrative” history is feasible, let alone Englund’s idea of “anti- 
-history” (ENGLUND 2012, p.XIII).
In addition, we need to bear in mind that Derrida takes the propositions 
of the linguistic turn (Rorty) to extremes by absolutizing language (there is 
nothing outside the discourse); similarly, Gumbrecht pushes Hayden White’s 
tenet to the limit (there is no difference between historical discourse and fictional 
discourse) by obliterating the historical discourse (when advocating the silence 
of the historian) and presenting only the documents. From our point of view, 
at the core of the problem is the relationship between historiography and the 
linguistic turn.
Chiaroscuro
Now is the suitable time to comment on Hayden White’s premise that 
discourse history is a literary artifact. Essencially, any tipe of prose is indeed 
a literary artifact. But the author’s meaning is undoubtedly more penetrating 
and implies the same opposing pair which comes up in Metahistory as well in 
his manifesto essay “The Burden of History” (WHITE 1994a, p. 39-63); the 
author opposes precisely “history as science” and the “literary artifact”. So for 
him history is either science or literature, not both. Incidentally, not only White, 
but all authors who propose the scientific status of history follow the same two- 
-valued logic. 
The world of science and technology exists and evolves  precisely by 
applying this logic. It is so powerful as to include humanities and shapes the way 
we see the world: “positive vs. negative”, “0 vs. 1”, “fiction vs. non-fictition”, 
“nature vs. culture”, “state of nature vs. civil society”, “raw vs. cooked”, “events 
vs. structure”, and we could go on and on. But differently from other human 
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“sciences”, discourse history is not self-contained within this binary logic, exactly 
on account of its inescapable commitment to the construction of social memory.
Thus, despite the unquestionable efficacy of binary logic, we ought to make 
every effort to transcend it, especially when it concers human issues – history. 
We call to mind Shakespeare’s Hamlet, who upon beholding his father’s ghost 
tells his friend Horatio that there are more things in heaven and earth than are 
dreamt of in our philosophy. This statement warrants a couple of alternative 
readings. We are told that ghosts do exist, if not on stage, whenever we fail 
to settle accounts with the past, as individuals or nations. Take Turkey, where 
any mention of the Armenian Genocide is widely regarded as a crime; Japanese 
authorities painstakingly striving to conceal the violence and the massacres 
recently perpetrated against Chinese and Korean people retorically referring to a 
“Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”; the United Nations Secretary General 
Kurt Waldheim, his accomplices in Austria and their conspiracy of silence about 
his less than accidental involvement with Nazism; the revisionist portrayal of the 
Holocaust as a total fabrication 7; the ever-present master-slave mentality in 
the ex-colonies of the American continent, where various forms of forced labor 
were (and remain) commonplace; in all these cases ghosts are ubiquitous and 
real. To settle accounts with the past means primarily to acknowledge them and 
to confront them. Denying their existence, sweeping them under the carpet or 
punishing those who dare to shatter the silence will not make them go away. But 
history can help us resolve these issues.
So if ghosts exist, could there be a viable alternative to binary logic 
when it comes to human affairs? Something undreamt of? Not everything is 
black or white, there are gray areas. And human imagination is capable of 
creating this alternative. That is the case of chiaroscuro in art, the doctrine of 
the “purgatory” (“neither heaven or hell”) and religious thought itself, of any 
tradition, the distinctly human creation to help us succeed in our atempt to cut 
through transcendence in order to explain that which cannot be fathomed let 
alone handled by ordinary means.
This should likewise inspire us to seek such an alternative in addressing 
issues involving discourse history. In the first place, Hayden White’s propositions 
seem rather deterministic, and so do those of linguistic turn proponents. The 
advances of linguistics and linguistic philosophy have led to the statement that 
language is an autonomous, specific, self-referential universe, a by-product of 
which would be the linguistic turn. Indeed, the very word “turn” (“giro”) seems 
to presuppose that logic. A turn of one hundred eighty degrees: either we have 
scientific discourse or a fictional discourse, nothing in between. This approach is 
based on a somewhat hidden assumption that needs do be exposed.
We now wish to bring to mind an article by Carlo Ginzburg – “Clues: Roots 
of an Evidential Paradigm” (GINZBURG 1989, p. 143-179). Ginzburg makes a 
suggestion that should be considered. He begins his article by mentioning an art 
7 For someone like Arnaldo Momigliano, whose parents were confined and executed in a Nazi extermination 
camp, it was very difficult to accept the idea that there is no available objectivity, that the historical text is a 
form of exercising power, a literary artifact and nothing else. Cf. STEINBERG 1991.
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critic who pretends to be Russian but is in fact Italian, and who considers museums 
“full of paintings with inexact attributions” but finds it difficult to trace an unsigned 
work to its real creator. The art scholar criticized the conventional wisdom in this 
field, saying it made no sense to depend on Da Vinci’s smiles to determine the 
authenticity of a painting; instead of using the most conspicuous charcteristics of 
a painting to distinguish originals from copies, one should concentrate on details 
such as earlobes and fingernails, which would be “clues” as to the authenticity 
of a work. It was easier to copy a Da Vinci smile than one of his ears or fingers.
The same art critic, according to Ginzburg, inspired Freud to found his 
own “science”, psychoanalysis. The psychoanalyst is not interested in outward 
signs, on what is plainly evident; rather, he focuses on faux pas, Freudian slips 
and unnoticed details. Ginzburg’s whole reasoning goes further to consider 
“epistemes”, “ruptures” or “mutations” not as abrupt transitions from “prior 
to writing” to “writing”, but continuities as far as language is concerned. In 
other words, since the beginning of time, the first humans tried to identify the 
footprints or hair of animals for hunting (or fleeing) purposes, as well as cave 
paintings – these are all signs which meant something about something  else 
that was no longer there, that is, a form of language. Such indices – to what 
was not present anymore – were a matter of life or death to a community. Thus 
language cannot be denied its indexing, referential quality. Vladimir Arseniev’s 
hero, the hunter Derzu Uzala, was capable of identifying animals, movements 
and situations from tracks – or signs – left in the environment where he lived. 
He could read the language of nature (ARSENIEV 1989).8
Obviously – linguistics dispels any doubt about it – linguistic systems are 
autonomous. Linguistic philosophy shows likewise that linguistic expression does 
not necessarily refer to a particular referent (as Quine rightly pointed out in the 
aforementioned text, what would be the referent of the expression “the round 
square cupola?”, but one cannot infer from this that “language is self referential”, 
that it has nothing to do with the extralinguistic world (QUINE 2011).  
Here we resume our initial reference to the insistence on defining history 
as a science, and how this approach to the problem presupposes the logical 
opposites “science vs. fiction”.9 In discussing attempts to define history, Johan 
Huizinga identifies a problem with the above-mentioned definition offered 
by Ernst Bernheim and Wilhelm Bauer: by defining history as science, they 
exclude, ipso facto, Greek, Latin and Medieval historians, as well as a significant 
part of modern and contemporary historiography. Huizinga teaches that history, 
from Herodotus to the present, constitutes a creation of memory and involves 
temporality and the definition of identity, as a distinctive trait of Western societies. 
This is the reason that Huizinga accurately defines history as “the spiritual form 
whereby a culture settles accounts with the past”  (HUIZINGA 1980, p. 95). 
8 Magnificently explored in the Akira Kurozawa film [1975].
9 One should not overlook the implicit bias in the opposition. To say “This is fiction” or “This is literature” is 
rather like saying it is of little consequence. Incidentally, readers are referred to this beautiful and significant 
defense of literature, written by Mario Vargas Llosa, published in the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo on 
June 15, 2003: “Não é a literatura que envenena a vida” (“It is not literature that poisons life”).
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Rather than lost in time, Huizinga’s ideas live on and remain influential. 
In the same way, Siegfried Kracauer uses a parable to say that the historical 
discourse implies a search for meaning – it is not just a record, like annals and 
chronicles in the olden days, but the quest for intelligibility of each part within 
the whole, of an event within its own structure. Kracauer is actively engaged 
in learning “more about the constitution and significance of this controversial 
branch of knowledge”. Having obtained freedom from metaphysics and theology, 
has history, he asks, become a science? So it claims to be, unquestioned. It 
can no longer be regarded as art, despite its literariness; nor is it a matter of 
impressionistic, subjective opinions. History, as we now know it, lies somewhere 
in a twilight zone created by its peculiar research and worldview. This go-between 
real is nonetheless invisible to the naked eye by reason of blinding deep-rooted 
traditional thinking, namely science and philosophy, as regards nature and 
mankind, inasmuch as they misrepresent historical research. Kracauer thus 
attempts to uphold the intrinsic legitimacy of this intermediate domain by calling 
it an ephemeral account of “the last things before the last”, as the “last things” 
belong in science and theology  (KRACAUER 1995, p. 15-16).10
In conclusion, let us return to our central character, Hayden White, the one 
who brought together the linguistic turn to history. A fine book about him was 
written by Herman Paul (mentioned earlier), who, for good reasons, chose to 
structure White’s book in a chronological order. Paul undertakes a lenghtly tour 
of his intellectual biography of the author, from his initial training as a historian, 
his research into the history of the Church in Italy, his first historical works – 
includin his impressive overview of the Greco-Roman cultural tradition (WHITE 
1973),11  – the publication of his essays on the linguistic turn, which made him 
famous, to his present-day work as professor at the time the biography was 
published in 2011. Paul notes that White has not lost his combativeness – which 
he appropriately calls humanistic existentialism – in spite of the fact that he has 
certainly re-evaluated his ideas, as found in Metahistory. This is what strikes us 
as we read an interview conducted by Erlend Rogne in Rome in 2007 (WHITE 
2009, p. 63-75),12 in which he defends or reconsiders some of his positions.
In the interview, Hayden White recalls his intellectual influences and 
discusses the relations between structure and event, the limits imposed by 
structures and the nondeterministic nature of the human condition, as we are 
continually called to make choices. He bears in mind what he learned from 
Aristotle: we perform conflictin roles in society; any role we choose to play well 
will inexorably undermine other roles we also need to occupy. This contradiction 
precludes us from living a “consistent, full” life. 
In ethics, White defines himself as a “situationist”: living in different 
situations, we cannot behave in the same way all the time. From structuralism he 
learned that each situation is always arbitrarily structured, just like language. The 
same applies to the rules that enable communication. To White, structuralism in 
10 I hereby acknowledge my debt to Professor Guillermo Zermeño Padilla.
11 Incidentally, Metahistory was published in the same year.
12 For Hayden White’s political views see also: ADAMA 2001, p. 12-17.
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no doubt important; yet, he keeps silent about changes in systematic structures, 
the main concern of post-structuralists such as Derrida, Foucault, Barthes and 
Lacan. Structuralism and post-structuralism would thus complement each other. 
On the other hand, the author associates structuralism with the superstructure 
of market economy, which dictates the choices individuals make and at once leads 
them to think they are truly free. Here an important role is played by Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s existencialism along with the Marxist view of history and society. White 
remembers that Roland Barthes once made him turn his attention to the theory of 
discourse and narrative and then to its tropological aspect; narrative discourse is 
adequate in some contexts but not in others. During the course of the interview, 
he thanks the interviewer for establishing a date for one of his writings, since he 
has changed his mind several times over the fifty years he has been writing. White 
also declares his predilection for modernism in literature due to its experimental 
work, thus questioning aesthetics of taste. As he points out, modernism results 
from the realization that the world we live in has no real essence or substance. 
Aristotelian substance theory is dead. Which implies the end of metaphysics and 
religion. Things are what they appear to be, there is no such things as an essence. 
In short, the interview seems to point to a self-examination of sorts: Hayden 
White’s formalist stance on the fundamental issue of the oppositions “event vs. 
structure” and “determinism vs. free will” no longer suffice to account for them, 
as he once defended in Metahistory, hence the importance of “mediations”.13
As we tread this narrow path, might we suggest that it is not a meaningless 
pursuit to reflect on the underlying binary oppositions which constrain discourse 
history; rather, we ought to take up the considerable challenge of thinking of 
this binary logic as part of what Kracauer has called “intermediate domain”, an 
approach which embraces the whole of the history of historiography, from the 
Greeks to the present, as well as its paramount features, namely the construction 
of social memory and the settling of accounts with the past, two sides, indeed, 
of the same coin.
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